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Introduction
Residential property prices are an important gauge of economic conditions writ large.
They reflect many macroeconomic factors as well as the particular local microeconomy of the property's location. Home values also compose an important part of household wealth, especially in lower income areas where residential property is typically a family's primary (or only) asset. In the United States, about a third of total assets for a given family are accounted for by owner-occupied housing, with that figure closer to two thirds for families below the median level of net wealth. 1 This statistic might be further skewed in developing countries, where the capacity of poor families to accumulate financial assets is more limited. Taken together, these observations suggest a powerful mechanism by which any policy affecting the determinants of house prices can alter the level and dispersion of household wealth.
In this paper, we investigate one example of this mechanism as it pertains to the connection between crime and house prices. Our first objective is to empirically identify and document the relationship between crime and house prices. As a public 'bad,' we fully expect crimes to exert a downward force on prices; indeed, this is a common finding in the related literature on house amenity valuation and the economics of conflicts. We quantify the extent to which prices are responsive to crime-related outcomes, as demonstrated by a recent policy experiment and with the use of highly detailed property price data from the online classified website ZAP (www.ZAP.com.br), and find that these effects can be quite large and economically meaningful. Our main innovation will then be to document and explain the distributional consequences of removing the public bad of crime; that is, the removal of crime may have heterogeneous effects on the prices of different residences in a manner which alters the degree of overall inequality among property values. This would happen, for example, if lower valued properties appreciate or depreciate disproportionately to a given change in the crime rate. We will discuss the circumstances under which that would occur in the context of a dynamic model of property valuation.
Our empirical work will show that decreasing crime does, in fact, benefit lower valued properties disproportionately, reducing the inequality among properties. This relationship is suggested in Figure 1 , which plots indices of homicides, robberies and a Gini coefficient of house prices for the city of Rio de Janeiro since 2008. 2 Since there are many different factors that can affect house prices simultaneously, we study the housing market around the time of a specific policy event tightly linked to the objective of crime reduction. This policy is the introduction of the Unidade Pacificadora da Policia ("Pacifying Police Unit," or UPP) program in Rio de Janeiro beginning in late 2008.
As in many metropolitan areas in developing countries, a significant fraction of the population of Rio live in very low-income communities with a high concentration of substandard, informal housing; in Rio, home to some of the largest of these communities in Latin America, they are called favelas. Over the past three decades, the city has been plagued by conflicts over territory in its favelas with drug gangs and militias, with many favelas effectively being occupied and governed by the drug gangs. The UPP program, in response, re-occupies specific favelas by force using elite police units, drives out the drug gangs and roots out caches of weapons and drugs, and then installs permanent police stations staffed by highly trained, well-paid and newly-recruited officers; eighteen such stations have been installed since 2008. The basic objective of re-occupation is the renewed assertion of the rule of law and the abatement of drug gang-related crimes.
The program, to the extent it is effective, is responsible for many positive externalities associated with the accomplishment of these objectives. Using detailed monthly data on residential property prices in Rio's formal housing market, as well as on homicide and robbery rates in each of Rio's neighborhoods, we formally test the hypotheses that neighborhoods closer to a UPP station experienced larger than average decreases in crime and larger than average increases in house prices after the UPP was put into place. In addition to the variation across neighborhoods and time, we exploit the staggered timing of the policy across the 18 UPPs by jointly estimating the individual effect of each one on house prices and crime. We find that, conditional on a UPP being installed nearby, house and apartment sales prices increased by an average of 5-10 percent, homicides decreased by an average of 10-25 percent, and robberies decreased by an average of roughly 10-20 percent. To gain perspective on the economic significance of the decrease in crime due to the UPPs, we use our regression results to construct counterfactual price and crime rates and, with those, city-wide statistics.
In the absence of the UPPs, the overall house price index in Rio would have grown about 15 percent slower since 2008, and homicide and robbery rates would have fallen by about 14 and 20 percent less than they did, respectively. We note that since we do not observe house prices inside the favelas themselves, our estimated price effects are quite likely to be underestimates of the true city-wide effects.
The empirical results, notwithstanding some heterogeneity in the effectiveness of individual UPP stations, confirm widely reported anecdotes of abated violence and of skyrocketing residential property prices in the formal housing markets surrounding the favelas. Our findings complement and extend previous work on the effectiveness of the UPPs. Based on household survey data, Neri (2011a) found that rental prices within all favelas in Rio rose by about 7 percent between 2007 and 2009. However, those results are not specific to each community protected by a UPP and do not control for secular trends in the Rio housing market. The positive externalities of UPPs are also explored in Cunha and Mello (2011) , which focuses on the formalization of services provision in a favela following the installation of a UPP. In addition to the direct valuation of disamenities due to crime that we emphasize below, formalization and urban regularization are other important channels through which crime reductions affect property prices, and which are captured in our estimates of the effect of the UPPs.
Having established that the UPPs influenced crime and house prices in opposite directions (that is, that the UPPs seem to be a reasonable instrument for the effect of crime on house prices), we use our estimates to analyze the association between crime and the dispersion of house prices. We present a model of property valuation in which there are diminishing returns to crime reduction; this implies that properties with either high initial crime rates or low amenity values have disproportionately large increases in price for a given decline in crime which, in turn, lowers inequality among properties. The mechanism in the model that gives rise to diminishing returns is the inclusion of historical crime rates as a determinant of current property values.
This treatment of the dynamic transmission of crime rates into house prices is quite similar in spirit to the way Besley and Mueller (2011) model the number of killings due to conflict as a function of the latent state of the peace process in Northern Ireland. In that model, the persistence of crime in a particular area has a bearing on what signal agents take from a change in the number of killings about the probability of entering a state of peace, and hence on the transmission of the rate of killings into house prices. In our model, we have a simpler treatment of agents' expectations but the transmission of a change in the crime rate into prices depends similarly on the history of crime, which is an additional state variable.
Thus, current and future consumption flows from housing depend on both the level and duration of crime rates in the past; lower initial crime rates with low historical duration gives rise to the biggest increases in price when the crime rate declines.
We document that the disparity in house prices in Rio did in fact decline following the implementation of the UPP policy. A Gini coefficient constructed with the actual and counterfactual house prices described above shows that the disparity in house prices across neighborhoods has been falling faster after installation of the UPPs than for the counterfactual Gini. Moreover, in several neighborhoods with a UPP nearby, we find evidence that the dispersion in property prices within those neighborhoods narrowed, suggesting that even within more homogeneous sets of properties the lowest valued ones are most sensitive to a change in the crime rate.
This paper contributes to several areas of active research, ranging from studies of the economics of conflict to the analysis of the wealth distribution. Most closely related are the works identifying the impact of crime and violence on property prices, with the paper by Besley and Mueller (2011) as a closest antecedent; as below, Besley and Mueller (2011) exploit both spatial and temporal variation in crime data to identify the effect on house prices, and they provide a model in which the response of property prices depends on the level and persistence of historical crime rates. The present study uses more disaggregate price data, at the level of neighborhoods in Rio, and has a different modeling approach that focuses more on the implications of crime for the dispersion of house prices. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to draw a connection between crime reduction and wealth inequality.
Our empirical measurement of the crime elasticity of house prices is connected to a sequence of papers estimating this (largely negative) elasticity. Early examples include We attempt to get around issues of cross-sectional endogeneity by exploiting the time variation around an exogenous policy experiment, the UPPs in Rio. A widely acknowledged objective of the UPP policy is to increase the safety around key venues for the 2014 soccer World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics, the locations of which are not systematically related to historical crime rates or the levels of property prices. As such, we will argue that the UPPs are a reasonable instrument for the effect of crime on house prices. We proceed by estimating a difference in differences estimator of property values in neighborhoods with a nearby UPP, straddling the public announcement that a UPP would be installed in those neighborhoods.
This method for estimating the (dis)amenities of housing is used analogously in Linden and Rockoff (2008) in their study of the effect of the proximity of registered sex-offenders on house prices. 3 Finally, this paper is related to a large literature on the determinants of wealth inequality.
Wolff (1992) illustrates that wealth concentration and inequality in the United States varied a lot over much of the 20 th century (both increasing and decreasing) and moved fairly closely with changes in the income distribution. Brazil, in particular, has made great strides recently to reduce its level of inequality. 4 Our work demonstrates a novel and potentially important channel by which policy can contribute to changes in the distribution of wealth.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides some background on the favelas in Rio and the official mandate of the UPP program. Section II describes the empirical model, followed by the details of the property price data and crime data in Section III, and the empirical results in Section IV. The valuation model and its predictions for the dispersion of house prices, as well as some empirical measures of house price inequality in Rio, can be found in Section V. Section VI concludes.
I. Background on the UPP program
Most of Rio de Janeiro's favelas are situated on the hillsides of the city and many are located in close proximity to affluent neighborhoods. Both of these factors have made them a favored haven for drug gangs. By commanding the high ground and through a mix of cooptation and explicit threats, heavily-armed gangs have gained effective control over the resident populations of certain favelas and have used these locations as bases to process, stockpile and distribute drugs. The profitability of such trafficking operations has led to 3 There are many other studies that estimate property (dis)amenities more broadly defined to include factors such as environment. Boyle Of the many favelas affected by drug gangs, the selection of which favelas were to receive a UPP was largely a political outcome. This is important for our empirical identification of the effect of UPPs on crime and house prices, since it mitigates the extent of reverse causality 6 Breaking with traditional repression techniques, newly trained officers are taught to be "community policemen" or "proximity police" by integrating themselves within the occupied community. Acknowledging the skepticism and mistrust that local populations have historically had with police activity, all UPP staff are newly admitted and trained for this specific purpose. This hiring and training practice is consistent with the idea that UPPs are meant to be the gateway for many other services beyond the suppression of criminal activity. 7 In an op-ed in the newspaper Globo, State Public Safety Secretary José Mariano Beltrame compared the UPP program (which he manages) to the Plano Real in 1994, which drastically reduced inflation and stabilized the economy (http://oglobo.globo.com/opiniao/apenas-primeiro-passo-3516738).
between our policy variable (the UPP) and each outcome. In other words, UPPs were not simply placed in the neighborhoods with the highest crime rates or lowest house prices.
Rather, the policy has been implemented by prioritizing important locations for the World Cup and Olympic Games, giving geographic factors a dominant role in determining the location of UPPs. This can be seen in the top panel of Figure 2 , in which the exact locations of the 18 existing UPPs are mapped with the gradient of average apartment sales prices for each neighborhood in Rio. It is evident that some UPPs were placed in high-priced neighborhoods while others were placed in low-priced neighborhoods. Similarly for the rate of homicides, shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2 , UPPs appear in some low homicide neighborhoods in the south zone, high homicide neighborhoods in the north zone, and neighborhoods with intermediate homicide rates in the west. Media commentary on the UPPs has suggested that while some neighborhoods received a UPP due to their high incidence of crime, UPPs were installed to garner political support for the UPP program and protect key
World Cup locations in the high-and middle-income South Zone (or Zona Sul). 8 Implementation of a UPP in a given favela occurs in a four-stage process. A similar protocol has been observed for most favelas, though it is not an official standard. First, the community or set of communities to be occupied is announced by the police up to 6 months in advance, though no specific date is given. Second, a series of announcements indicating the imminence of the occupation occur, including an announcement that it will happen in the next 1-2 weeks. Between 4-7 days prior to the occupation, the specific date is made public and police begin encircling the favela(s). Third, heavily-armed Civil and Military Police, led by elite forces, invade a favela in the early twilight hours and expel the drug traffickers in the neighborhood. Over the next few days of week, they systematically sweep the area to clear any remaining criminals or contraband and set up a temporary station. Finally, the permanent physical station is installed and control is handed over to a new UPP battalion. In the majority of cases, and as an intended consequence of the pre-announcements, this process has led to very little violent confrontation as criminals have already left the area. 8 Several sources indicate that geography rather than crime rate is the dominant factor in determining the location of UPPs. In an interview in January 2012, the director of communication for the state police force, Frederico Caldas, linked expanding the number of police at UPPs with the goal of ensuring security ahead of the World Cup and Olympic Games. A prime example of this goal is the invasion of Rocinha, Vidigal and Chacara do Céu in the affluent (relatively low-crime) South Zone of Rio, an operation which is widely cited for protecting tourist infrastructure.
As shown in Table 1 
II. Estimating the effect of UPPs on property prices and crime rates
Our baseline measure of the effect of the UPPs is a difference in differences estimator for all of the 18 UPPs installed between November 2008 and November 2011. 11 Our elemental 9 When available in media reports, Table 1 includes the date that the UPP was announced, though in many instances these dates, if reported, were only a few days prior to occupation. Since the announcement data are not published officially, we rely on media reports to ascertain their timing; newspaper coverage tends to pick up the story of a UPP only once invasion is imminent (i.e., shortly before the third stage described above). 10 In addition, as of the date of this manuscript, the cluster of favelas known as Complexo do Alemão, containing approximately 125,000 inhabitants, was occupied by 3,000 highly trained army troops, while another immense tract of communities in Rocinha, Vidigal and Chácara do Céu, occupied in November 2011, had an unknown number of crack units still searching for drugs and weapons. 11 Two large clusters of communities, Complexo do Alemão and Rocinha/Vidigal, are excluded as no UPP was installed yet by the end of 2011 (as of January 2012, two new UPPs were established in Vidigal and Chácara do Céu, to be followed by Rocinha). Given significant differences in the size and scope of those UPPs, it is difficult to apply our findings for the first 18 UPPs to them (or, for that matter, to subsequent UPPs). However, under the unit of measure is the monthly average listing price of a property with certain characteristics, such as dwelling type (i.e., apartment or house) and number of bedrooms, in a given neighborhood. For instance, one price observation would be the average price of a 3-bedroom apartment in Botafogo in January 2010. The localized nature of the policy in specific favelas as well as its sequential rollout leads to variation in property prices across neighborhoods, time and property characteristics. The elasticity of house prices to the installation of a UPP is estimated using the following specification: Dist is used: (i) the neighborhood in which the UPP is located (the penultimate column of Table 1 ), (ii) neighborhoods with a border within 2km of the UPP address (the final column of Table 1 ), and (iii) neighborhoods whose centroid is within 2km of the UPP address.
assumption that subsequent UPPs are on average as effective as previous ones, our estimates of the overall effect of UPPs on house prices and crime understate the effects of the program as a whole.
The influence of each UPP on house prices is given by the coefficients n An important concern about the use of average price changes (of a sample of listings) to measure trends in the housing market is that the composition or quality of the sample could be changing over time. Changing property composition, such as the entry of a high-quality, high-priced property into the listings, would affect the average price used in the estimation of (1) even if the true quality-adjusted price of housing had not changed. This is a relevant issue if composition is changing systematically in a way that is correlated with the timing of the UPP policy. It is therefore important to check whether housing composition might be changing in response to the introduction of UPPs and to correct for this selection bias in equation (1) . To do so, we use the two-stage correction procedure by Heckman (1976 Heckman ( , 1979 and estimate the probability that a property with certain characteristics (i.e., neighborhood, type, # rooms) is listed. The first stage probit regression is of the form:
In (2) We note that the sample selection correction, while useful as a gauge for the determinants of listings for groups of properties (e.g., 2-versus 3-bedroom apartments in Botafogo), still does not account for compositional effects within those groups (e.g., high-versus low-quality 2-bedroom apartments in Botafogo). These compositional effects might be tainting our results below, though it is not obvious whether one would expect a decrease in crime induced by the UPPs to cause higher-or lower-quality properties within each group to be listed.
Finally, estimates of the UPP effect on house prices from equations (1) and (2) are used to construct a series of counterfactual average property prices; these are the prices that the regressions suggest would have been observed in the absence of the UPP policy. The growth rate of the counterfactual price, ib t P , in a given period is constructed as follows:
is the predicted value of average prices from the regressions (1) or (2), n , 3
 is the estimated elasticity of property prices due to the UPPs and Our treatment of crime rates is broadly analogous to that of house prices in equation (1), except we substitute the neighborhood crime rate, b t r , for property prices and remove the controls for property characteristics:
Since crime rates are reported in each neighborhood and time period, there is no need to correct for selection issues. Given estimates of (4), the growth of counterfactual crime rates can be computed as: 
III. House prices and crime data
This section describes the sources of detailed property price and crime data for the city of precisely price responses like these that our difference in differences estimator will attribute to the UPPs; in each case, the bairro containing the UPP (the treatment group) increased relative to the other (the control) after the occupation of the favela. A more subtle, and more common, case is illustrated in Figure 4 , showing the average apartment prices in four neighborhoods as well as vertical lines denoting the occupations of the aforementioned favelas. One difference in Figure 4 is that the prices all have secular upward trends and so the difference in differences estimator will attribute to the UPPs increases in the slope of the treatment group price index relative to the control group indices after the installation of each UPP. Another difference in Figure 4 is the inclusion of prices for Botafogo and Leblon, neighborhoods that share a border with Copacabana and Ipanema, respectively. The inclusion of these neighborhoods in the treatment group (or not) will clearly have a bearing on the measured price effects of the UPPs in this example. We will consider both cases below.
b) ISP crime data
The crime data are compiled by the Institute of Public Safety of Rio de Janeiro (the
Instituto de Segurança Pública do Rio de Janeiro, or ISP). ISP is responsible for
consolidating and publishing an array of official statistical data pertaining to public safety.
The crime data that we use are drawn originally from incident reports written by the state civil police and then aggregated into groups of different types of crime; 12 Integrated Area of Public Safety, or AISP. 13 To compute crime rates, we divide the crime counts for each DP by the corresponding monthly AISP population data.
14 Figure 5 shows the relationship between our two measures of the crime rate and average sale prices for apartments. Each point is the average crime rate and property price for a particular neighborhood, averaging across time periods. As seen in the top panel, homicide rates range from 4 to 188 homicides per 100,000 people per year, while average robbery rates vary from 48 to 4,333 per 100,000 people per year. For both crimes, the distribution is positively skewed, with most neighborhoods having low rates and only a few having very high rates. Turning to the correlation between crime and apartment prices, the figures demonstrate that having a low crime rate is necessary though not sufficient for a neighborhood to have a high average property price; while there are no neighborhoods with a high crime rate and a high property price, there are several neighborhoods with low crime and low price. One might surmise from this observation that crime is but one amenity affecting property prices, which only becomes a dominant price-determining factor at very high rates.
The triangles in Figure 5 show the neighborhoods where one or more of the UPPs are located. It is worth noting that the UPP stations are located in neighborhoods that vary along 13 The official concordance between neighborhoods, DP's and AISP's can be found at the following website: http://urutau.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/Uploads/RelacaoAISP.pdf. 14 We note that the computation of neighborhood-level crime statistics using DP-and AISP-level statistics introduces some imprecision into our measure of the incidence of crime. Specifically, each neighborhood is assumed to have the crime data reported by its DP. This biases the crime statistics upwards as each neighborhood within a DP is erroneously assigned some crimes from other neighborhoods that share their DP. On the other hand, the population data are only available at the AISP level, which typically consist of multiple DP's. By assuming that each neighborhood has the population level of its entire AISP, the crime rate statistic is biased downward. On balance, the average crime rates that we compile are somewhat below their more aggregate published counterparts, though only slightly. Table 2 , while the average crime rates are 27 and 538 incidents per 100,000 people per year for homicides and robberies, respectively. Despite the more aggregate data that we use to construct neighborhood crime rates, the average homicide rate falls within the range (albeit on the low end) of the 42 and 27 homicides per 100,000 rate reported by Waiselfisz (2011) for the city as a whole in 2007 and 2010, respectively.
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IV. Results
Estimates of n , 3
 are shown in Table 3 for five different specifications of the property price regressions. Each column contains 15 coefficients for the interaction term of the UPP time dummy and proximity measure, one for each UPP station with certain UPPs pooled as described above. The baseline specification, (I), is an OLS regression of equation (1) where the proximity measure is the neighborhood(s) in which the favela receiving the UPP is located. We find that 11 of 15 coefficients on the difference in differences term are positive and statistically significant compared to two coefficients which were negative and significant.
An F-test of the hypothesis that the sum of n , 3  is zero is strongly rejected and the sum of price effects divided by the 18 UPP stations is 5.8 percent. In other words, conditional on being in the neighborhood of a UPP, property prices increased by 5.8 percent more than in the rest of the city after the UPP was announced. There is also a fair amount of heterogeneity in the price responses across UPPs, from 6 percent following the Batam UPP to the 21 percent jump following the Chapéu-Mangueira UPP.
The estimates of price effects and their distribution across UPPs in (I) are quite stable across estimation methodologies. Column (II) shows estimates of equation (1) An even more careful treatment of possible selection effects into the ZAP listing sample models the probability of a given type of observation having non-zero listings, as in equation (2) . Column (III) shows the results of the two stage procedure using the Heckman correction factor. In the first-stage selection regression, an F-test with null-hypothesis 0 The estimates of price effects are also robust to alternative specifications of the treatment group, though these changes in specification have a bearing on the interpretation of the magnitudes of the resulting estimates. Columns (IV) reports the UPP price effects for neighborhoods with a border within 2 kilometers of each UPP station, respectively, estimated using weighted least squares. 16 Strikingly, the inclusion of many more neighborhoods in the treatment group (relative to (II)) yields estimates that, although lower than before, are still positive and very significant. In column (IV), 13 of 15 UPPs have a positive and significant coefficient. Additionally, the variation in the size of price effects across UPPs has gone down, with the majority of estimates in the range of 5 to 10 percent. It is intuitive that the level of the effect would decrease when spread across a larger geographic area. This phenomenon is illustrated rather dramatically by Chapéu-Mangueira; the border estimate, which includes Copacabana, Urca and Botafogo in the treatment group (in addition to Leme), is less than half the size of the bairro-based estimate. On the other hand, precisely because the effect is applied to a much larger geographic base of listings, it may well have a larger overall influence on Rio house prices. Our counterfactual price series below will be informative of which specification implies a larger effect on the overall price index.
Finally, column (V) shows the results for bairros with a centroid within 2km of a UPP station. While the average effect of 5.7 percent is in line with the other specifications, on a UPP-by-UPP basis results tended to vary without much discernable pattern. In some instances, the effects were in between those of columns (II) and (IV) as one might expect from the addition of an intermediate number of bairros into the treatment group. In others, the results were notably stronger or weaker. In sum, while the average effect held fairly steady at upwards of 5 percent, the disparities across UPPs varied from specification to specification.
To put the overall effect of the UPP policy into perspective, we translate the results of each specification into counterfactual measures of house price growth rates as described in equation (3), then aggregate across property types for the entire city of Rio as follows: 17 FIPEZAP, an organization that publishes aggregate price indexes based on the same underlying data that we use here (Rio is one of several regions for which FIPEZAP publishes an index), has a different way of aggregating across types of property and bairros. While the index formula we use is the same (i.e., a weighted average of the levels of price observations) FIPEZAP uses household income data from the 2000 census to weight across geographic areas and number of rooms. In the absence of those weights, we use the number of We will focus on the change in overall average counterfactual prices (computed in the same manner) relative to the observed aggregate. Each of the counterfactual series in Figure   6 relates to a specification in Table 3 . What is striking about the counterfactuals is that, with the exception of the border measure of proximity, the series are quite close together. This implies that the heterogeneity in: (i) econometric technique, (ii) observation weights, and (iii) the geographic scope of the centroid-based treatment group across specifications does not amount to much when applied to the population of prices. The fact that the border-based counterfactual lies below the rest indicates that the estimated overall influence of the UPPs is indeed sensitive to geographic scope when applied as broadly as in that specification. In other words, lower average price effects in the border specification are more than fully offset by the larger base of neighborhoods that they are being applied to. All in all, the range of Figure 8 illustrates the homicide elasticity of property prices, where each dot matches the coefficients from (1) and (3) in Tables 3 and 4 , respectively. Due to the imprecision of the some of the homicide estimates, only the matches where both policy coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent level are shown. There is a clear negative relationship between crime and property prices, with a ten percent decline in the homicide rate corresponding to a 1.8 percent increase in nearby house prices.
V. Crime and house price inequality
Having established an empirical relationship between crime and residential property prices, we now derive formal expressions for the changes in the distribution of house prices due to a discrete change in the crime rate. We then evaluate the predictions of the model by constructing measures of inequality within-and across-bairros in the ZAP data. a) A model of house price dispersion
The only source of variation in the model is a change in the probability of a crime First, we assume that the consumption value of housing, denoted U , for a specific property ( i ) depends on a time-invariant amenity value, ib h , reflecting the property's characteristics, as well as a term summarizing the complete history of crime in the bairro in which the property is located:
denotes the l -th lag of the crime rate relative to time t . This latter term enters negatively into the expression for consumption services as the value of the public 'bad' due to crime. In that summation, we also make an important assumption about the dynamics of consumption services due to the probability of a crime; the contribution of lagged values of crime to consumption services decays geometrically over time, which introduces some nonlinearity in the response of utility and, as we will show below, in the response of house prices to a change in r . The price of a property is the stream of future consumption flows, discounted by a factor  , which for a constant crime rate is:
which brings us to our first proposition relating the levels of prices and crime. Proposition 1 is a close analogue to equation (1) in the empirical exercise above, which relates house prices to the installation of a UPP conditional on the average price level in each bairro and the average growth rate of prices for properties in the control group. Now let us consider a change in the value of UPP from zero to one. We can rewrite equation (7) in terms of both ) 0 ( r and ) 1 ( r . Thus, n periods after the installation of a UPP, the consumption services of a property in that period are:
Notice that the first two terms in this expression represent the consumption services of a property where the entire history of crime in its neighborhood at the level ) 1 ( r . The combined third and fourth terms are a function of the relative weight given to more recent history at the lower crime rate and more distant history at the higher crime rate. The size of the contribution of this combined term to total consumption services depends crucially on the size of the difference between the old and new crime rate; when there is no difference between ) 0 ( r and ) 1 ( r the third and fourth terms cancel out, and when ) 0 ( r > ) 1 ( r , the third and fourth terms are a net negative contribution to total consumption services.
This particular specification of housing consumption services is a departure from related literature, such as Besley and Mueller (2011) in which house prices are a linear function of contemporaneous amenity value and the crime rate, but its treatment of dynamics is quite similar in spirit. In our model, we have a much simpler treatment of agents' expectations (i.e., agents assume a constant crime rate going forward) but the transmission of a one-time change in the crime rate into prices depends similarly on the history of crime. Specifically, immediately after the change ( 1  n ), the value of consumption services does not move all the way up to
, but rather asymptotically approaches that level as the history of ) 0 ( r fades. Thus, current and future consumption flows depend on both the level and duration of crime rates in the past.
Proposition 2: Conditional on a property's amenity value ( ib h ), progressively larger decreases in crime lead to smaller marginal improvements in housing consumption services.
In other words, there are diminishing marginal returns to crime reduction. This follows
directly from the concavity of consumption services in the crime rate:
We can illustrate this second proposition graphically using equation (8) . Figure 9(a) illustrates the crime-related portion of consumption services (i.e., the combined second, third and fourth terms) for a hypothetical reduction in r from an initial level of
clear from the concavity of the curves for any n that larger decreases in crime lead to smaller increases in housing consumption services. Further, the degree of curvature in the consumption services schedule increases with n , the number of periods ago that the UPP was installed. This is an intuitive result. The longer ago the UPP was installed (i.e., for larger n )
agents care less about incremental units of the decrease in crime.
Diminishing returns to crime reduction could play a key role in the changing distribution of property prices after the establishment of the UPPs. For example, two properties with identical amenity values in bairros with different crime rates could potentially have very different responses to the installation of a UPP and a common decrease in crime. The property in the bairro with a high crime rate will both have lower initial prices and a larger change in its consumption services, which will have the effect of compressing the distribution of property prices across bairros. In principle, this same effect would apply for two properties within the same bairro were they to face either different initial levels of crime or different changes in their crime rate. However, in light of the fact that we only observe bairro-level data, we have assumed in equations (7) and (8) that the crime rate affects the values of all properties within a bairro uniformly.
This assumption need not imply that the distribution of house prices within bairros is unaffected by a uniform reduction in crime. As the next proposition shows, variation in the amenity value of properties within a bairro is sufficient to create concavity in house prices relative to the crime rate. This is because when amenity values are higher, the percent change in crime-related consumption services after a decrease in crime is applied to a higher (timeinvariant) base, implying a lower percent change in the sum of the amenity value and crimerelated consumption services. Proof: We will first need to derive an expression for the price of a property immediately after the establishment of a UPP. The net present value of future consumption flows is:
Therefore, the percent change in a property when a UPP is established is: . 19 Higher values indicate greater inequality of prices across neighborhoods. 19 Since the panel of price observations is highly unbalanced (i.e., there are many neighborhoods that were not initially in the sample but entered over the course of the past three years) N includes only those that appeared in the ZAP data in January 2008. It is important to have a balanced panel to control for the changing composition ZAP combined with the estimates of the price effects of the UPPs in Table 3 , one can infer whether low-priced properties responded disproportionately to the UPPs. Replicating our analysis of the price effects on UPP levels, we estimate the following difference in differences regression:
where the only distinction between equations (10) and (1) is that the dependent variable is the log of the bairro-level standard deviation of property prices as opposed to the log of the average price. A negative estimate of n , 3
 means that the standard deviation of prices declined due to the UPP at the same time as the average price increased (Table 3 ). These two observations together necessarily imply that the lower-priced properties grew faster than the higher-priced properties in neighborhoods with a UPP nearby. Table 5 shows the estimates of n In sum, while city-wide price inequality appears to have declined due to the UPPs, the sign of the effect on within-bairro price dispersion is ambiguous across specifications. One likely difficulty with testing Proposition 3 is that the initial crime rates and changes in crime are unlikely to be uniform within a neighborhood, much less for different distances from a UPP. It is also possible that amenity values are correlated with UPP distance within a neighborhood in a way that makes the effect of crime on dispersion difficult to identify. Both of these measurement issues suggest that inequality could be better identified using more disaggregate data on individual listings, which is a worthwhile approach for future work on this subject.
VI. Concluding remarks
The basis of the UPP program is reestablishing the rule of law where order was dictated by groups engaged in criminal activity. Destabilizing such groups by removing their physical domain over the favelas was meant to: (i) reduce criminality and violence; (ii) ease availability and access to public services, including health, education, sanitation; (iii) create a better environment for business and commerce (not limited to popular "social" tourism); and (iv) generally improve quality of life. The UPP policy has been widely regarded as being a successful strategy to achieve these goals, and we have demonstrated that the associated positive externalities manifested themselves in property prices. Between 2008 and mid-2011, we estimate that the UPPs accounted for about 15 percent of price growth in Rio's formal property markets, an observation which we link to the contribution of the UPPs to falling crime rates.
We then describe and document the relationship between crime and property price inequality. A key theoretical insight is that incorporating historical crime rates into a property's valuation causes the rate of price adjustment following a decrease in crime to depend on the property's initial value. Thus price inequality can potentially decrease as lowpriced properties react more to crime reductions. Indeed, the UPPs account for a non-trivial portion of the trend decline in inequality across neighborhoods in Rio. The mean of our various empirical specifications suggests that almost half of the decline in price inequality over the sample period is attributable to the UPPs.
These findings illustrate a potentially significant new dimension of policies aimed at reducing either crime or inequality. Existing attempts to ameliorate economic disparities tend to focus on transfers of income and policies capable of reshaping the wealth distribution in any meaningful way are uncommon. The UPPs in Rio demonstrate that crime reduction can play a role in reducing economic inequity, operating through the distribution of wealth. In principle, this should be an important consideration for crime-and conflict-laden regions elsewhere. 
